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add denial-of-service 

[Imported from Trac: page NewCaps/WhatCouldGoWrong, version 6]
davidsarah 2009-10-11 01:01:22 +00:00
parent 19f88c266b
commit c7d7682951
1 changed files with 5 additions and 2 deletions
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NewCaps/WhatCouldGoWrong.md

@ -8,9 +8,12 @@ This is about What Could Go Wrong with the "Elk Point 2" immutable file caps: <h
|3|forgery of immutable file|generate a matching read-cap (*R*,*T*) for someone else's file|anyone|any one file|the hash function's and cap format's second-pre-image resistance on (*R*,*T*)|2^*n*+*t*^| |3|forgery of immutable file|generate a matching read-cap (*R*,*T*) for someone else's file|anyone|any one file|the hash function's and cap format's second-pre-image resistance on (*R*,*T*)|2^*n*+*t*^|
|4|roadblock or speedbump [2]footnote|generate (*K1enc*,*Dhash*,*V*) that hash to someone else's *T*, and copy their *S*|anyone|any one file|the hash function's and cap format's collision resistance on *T*|2^*t*^| |4|roadblock or speedbump [2]footnote|generate (*K1enc*,*Dhash*,*V*) that hash to someone else's *T*, and copy their *S*|anyone|any one file|the hash function's and cap format's collision resistance on *T*|2^*t*^|
|5|unauthorized read|attack the encryption of the plaintext with *K1*|anyone|any one file|the cipher's security and the secrecy of the encryption key *K1*|2^*k*^| |5|unauthorized read|attack the encryption of the plaintext with *K1*|anyone|any one file|the cipher's security and the secrecy of the encryption key *K1*|2^*k*^|
|6|unauthorized read|figure out the input to the hash function that generates *S*|anyone|any one file|the hash function's pre-image resistance on *S*|brute force attack on *R* is !#2| |6|unauthorized read|figure out the input to the hash function that generates *S*|anyone|any one file|the hash function's pre-image resistance on *S*|brute force on *R* is !#2|
|7|unauthorized deletion|brute force KD|anyone|any one file|secrecy of *KD*|
|8|unauthorized deletion|figure out the destroy key KD from Dhash|anyone|any one file|the hash function's pre-image resistance on *Dhash*|
|9|denial of service|prevent access to servers holding sufficient shares (by controlling some of them, or by attacking them)|anyone|any file|not prevented by crypto|
where *k* = bitlength(*K1*), *n* = bitlength(*R*), *t* = bitlength(*T*). where *k* = bitlength(*K1*), *n* = bitlength(*R*), *t* = bitlength(*T*), *d* = bitlength(*KD*).
1. *shape-shifter immutable file*: creator creates more than one file matching the immutable file readcap 1. *shape-shifter immutable file*: creator creates more than one file matching the immutable file readcap
2. *roadblock*: attacker prevents uploader (including repairer) from being able to write a real share into the right storage index; *speedbump*: attacker adds his bogus share into the list of shares stored under the storage index by the same method; downloader has to download, examine, and discard the bogus (*K1enc*,*Dhash*,*V*)'s until it finds the real one 2. *roadblock*: attacker prevents uploader (including repairer) from being able to write a real share into the right storage index; *speedbump*: attacker adds his bogus share into the list of shares stored under the storage index by the same method; downloader has to download, examine, and discard the bogus (*K1enc*,*Dhash*,*V*)'s until it finds the real one