cost of attack !#12 is not relevant because attack !#3 is strictly better

[Imported from Trac: page NewCaps/WhatCouldGoWrong, version 40]
davidsarah 2009-10-11 16:17:10 +00:00
parent 23a116d7f1
commit add6842ae1

@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ This is about What Could Go Wrong with the "Elk Point 2" immutable file caps: <h
|9|denial of service|prevent access to servers holding sufficient shares (by controlling some of them, or by attacking them or the network)|anyone|any file|not prevented by crypto|not applicable|
|10|cause invalid share to verify|generate (*K1enc*,*Dhash*,*V*) that hash to someone else's (*T*,*U*), and copy their *S*|anyone|any one file|the hash function's second-preimage resistance on (*T*,*U*)|*p*/*N*.2^*t*+*u*^ [5]footnote|
|11|undeletion [3]footnote|restore a deleted file's shares by controlling the relevant servers|anyone|any one file|not prevented by crypto|not applicable|
|12|undeletion [3]footnote|generate matching (*R*,*T*,*U*) for a deleted file|anyone|any one file|the hash function's and cap format's second-preimage resistance on (*R*,*T*,*U*)|*p*/*N*.2^*r*+*t*+*u*^ [5]footnote|
|12|undeletion [3]footnote|generate matching (*R*,*T*,*U*) for a deleted file|anyone|any one file|the hash function's and cap format's second-preimage resistance on (*R*,*T*,*U*)|higher cost than !#3|
where *k* = bitlength(*K1*), *r* = bitlength(*R*), *s* = bitlength(*S*), *t* = bitlength(*T*), *u* = bitlength(*U*), *d* = bitlength(*KD*), *dh* = bitlength(*Dhash*).