tahoe-lafs/trac-2024-07-25
2
0
Issues 1.1k Wiki Activity

public key algorithm -> signature algorithm (signatures don't necessarily require trapdoor public key crypto) 

[Imported from Trac: page NewMutableEncodingDesign, version 19]
davidsarah 2010-05-04 20:00:57 +00:00
parent c73fd8a6eb
commit 8e076cce41
1 changed files with 2 additions and 2 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

4
NewMutableEncodingDesign.md

@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ The dirnode encoding would use H(writecap) to protect the child writecaps,
H(readcap) to protect the child readcaps, and H(traversapcap) to protect the
child verifycap/traversalcaps.
## Any public key algorithm, no semi-private keys, no traversalcap
## Any signature algorithm, no semi-private keys, no traversalcap
Without semi-private keys, we need something more complicated to protect the
readkey: the only thing that can be mathematically derived from the writecap
@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ with keys shorter than 2*K for a K-bit security level. Since we can use shorter
hashes than public keys, the H(pubkey) design above gives us shorter read caps,
although they are not shorter than using semi-private keys.
### Any public key algorithm, no semi-private keys, with traversalcap
### Any signature algorithm, no semi-private keys, with traversalcap
Since a secure pubkey identifier (either H(pubkey)[:K+T] or the original privkey)
is present in all caps, it's easy to insert arbitrary intermediate levels. It