public key algorithm -> signature algorithm (signatures don't necessarily require trapdoor public key crypto)

[Imported from Trac: page NewMutableEncodingDesign, version 19]
davidsarah 2010-05-04 20:00:57 +00:00
parent c73fd8a6eb
commit 8e076cce41

@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ The dirnode encoding would use H(writecap) to protect the child writecaps,
H(readcap) to protect the child readcaps, and H(traversapcap) to protect the H(readcap) to protect the child readcaps, and H(traversapcap) to protect the
child verifycap/traversalcaps. child verifycap/traversalcaps.
## Any public key algorithm, no semi-private keys, no traversalcap ## Any signature algorithm, no semi-private keys, no traversalcap
Without semi-private keys, we need something more complicated to protect the Without semi-private keys, we need something more complicated to protect the
readkey: the only thing that can be mathematically derived from the writecap readkey: the only thing that can be mathematically derived from the writecap
@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ with keys shorter than 2*K for a K-bit security level. Since we can use shorter
hashes than public keys, the H(pubkey) design above gives us shorter read caps, hashes than public keys, the H(pubkey) design above gives us shorter read caps,
although they are not shorter than using semi-private keys. although they are not shorter than using semi-private keys.
### Any public key algorithm, no semi-private keys, with traversalcap ### Any signature algorithm, no semi-private keys, with traversalcap
Since a secure pubkey identifier (either H(pubkey)[:K+T] or the original privkey) Since a secure pubkey identifier (either H(pubkey)[:K+T] or the original privkey)
is present in all caps, it's easy to insert arbitrary intermediate levels. It is present in all caps, it's easy to insert arbitrary intermediate levels. It