From 586458fe19d3e7dd77b74b1046281bf8851885c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: zooko <>
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2013 14:54:31 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Apparently Julian's implementation isn't stateless.

[Imported from Trac: page OneHundredYearCryptography, version 26]
---
 OneHundredYearCryptography.md | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/OneHundredYearCryptography.md b/OneHundredYearCryptography.md
index ee0f2a8..63e7867 100644
--- a/OneHundredYearCryptography.md
+++ b/OneHundredYearCryptography.md
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Discussion on the tahoe-dev list with Zooko, Brian Warner, Jack Lloyd, and Daira
 
 Zooko posted [//pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-February/006133.html "back of the envelope" performance constraints]. Bottom-line: you get 30 million ARM instructions to implement one complete digital signature verification.
 
-Julian Wälde has [*pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-March/006237.html posted an actual implementation] of hash-based digital signatures! Exciting fact: his implementation [*pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-July/006554.html meets] Zooko's [//pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-February/006133.html performance criteria]!
+Julian Wälde has [*pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-March/006237.html posted an actual implementation] of hash-based digital signatures. This scheme apparently isn't actually a *stateless* scheme like the ones discussed above, but it does meet [*pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-July/006554.html meets] Zooko's [//pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-February/006133.html performance criteria].
 
 Brian and David-Sarah wrote [a simulator]source:trunk/misc/simulators/hashbasedsig.py or two to explore performance trade-offs in (stateless) hash-based signature parameters. The output of one run with the following parameters is this (note that the signing times include regeneration of per-message signing keys from a small long-term private key):
 ```