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multicollision attacks 

[Imported from Trac: page NewCaps/WhatCouldGoWrong, version 45]
davidsarah 2009-10-15 04:40:28 +00:00
parent d05f1fb05f
commit 27a7bd9e48
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NewCaps/WhatCouldGoWrong.md

@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ This is about What Could Go Wrong with the "Elk Point 2" immutable file caps: <h
| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|#|*what bad thing could happen*|*how*|*who could do it*|*what could they target*|*what crypto property prevents it*|*how expensive to brute force*|
|1|shape-shifter immutable file [1]footnote|collide read-cap (*R*,*T*)|creator of a file|their own file|the hash function's and cap format's collision resistance on the read-cap (*R*,*T*). This also depends on the encryption of *K1* being deterministic and correct.|approx sqrt(2.*p*).2^(*r*+*t*)/2^ [7]footnote|
|1|shape-shifter immutable file [1]footnote|collide read-cap (*R*,*T*)|creator of a file|their own file|the hash function's and cap format's collision resistance on the read-cap (*R*,*T*). This also depends on the encryption of *K1* being deterministic and correct.|approx sqrt(2.*p*).2^(*r*+*t*)/2^ [7,8]footnotes|
|2|unauthorized read|attack the encryption of *K1* with *R*|anyone|any one file|the security of the encryption scheme used for *K1*, and the secrecy of the read-key *R*|*p*.2^min(*r*,*k*)^|
|3|forgery of immutable file|generate a matching read-cap (*R*,*T*) for someone else's file|anyone|any one file|the hash function's and cap format's second-preimage resistance on (*R*,*T*). This also depends on the encryption of *K1* being deterministic and correct.|(*p*/*N*).2^*r*+*t*^ [5]footnote|
|3|forgery of immutable file|generate a matching read-cap (*R*,*T*) for someone else's file|anyone|any one file|the hash function's and cap format's second-preimage resistance on (*R*,*T*). This also depends on the encryption of *K1* being deterministic and correct.|(*p*/*N*).2^*r*+*t*^ [5,8]footnotes|
|4|roadblock or speedbump [2]footnote|generate (*K1enc*,*Dhash*,*V*) that hash to someone else's *T*, and copy their *S*|anyone [6]footnote|any one file|the hash function's and cap format's second-preimage resistance on *T*|(*p*/*N*).2^*t*^|
|5|unauthorized read|attack the encryption of the plaintext with *K1*|anyone|any one file|the security of the encryption scheme used for the plaintext, and the secrecy of the encryption key *K1*. The latter also depends on the security and seeding of the RNG that generated it.|*p*.2^*k*^|
|6|unauthorized read|figure out the input to the hash function that generates *S*|anyone|any one file|the hash function's onewayness for (*R*,*T*) -> *S*|brute force on *R* is !#2|
@ -37,3 +37,5 @@ where *k* = bitlength(*K1*), *r* = bitlength(*R*), *s* = bitlength(*S*), *t* = b
6. *roadblock*/*speedbump* attacks could be restricted to holders of a read cap by use of an extra signature, as in the Elk Point 3 design (diagram at <http://jacaranda.org/tahoe/mutable-addonly-elkpoint-3.svg> for mutable files).
7. The formula given in the Wikipedia Birthday Attack page is sqrt(2.ln(1/(1-*p*))).2^(*r*+*t*)/2^, but the approximation given here is very accurate for small *p*, and can only underestimate the cost. For *p* = 1/2 it underestimates by only a factor of 1.18. For *p* near 1 it underestimates severely; it is very hard for an attacker to be *certain* to find a collision.
8. In order for the combined hash with output (*R*,*T*) to have the strength against collision and preimage attacks given here, there must not be multicollision attacks against the hash truncated to *r* bits or to *t* bits that would yield an easier attack on the combined hash. [mailing list article]ref