tahoe-lafs/trac-2024-07-25
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KD in !#8 need not be the original KD 

[Imported from Trac: page NewCaps/WhatCouldGoWrong, version 27]
davidsarah 2009-10-11 03:41:56 +00:00
parent bfafd557d3
commit 26bf0b1509
1 changed files with 1 additions and 1 deletions
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NewCaps/WhatCouldGoWrong.md

@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ This is about What Could Go Wrong with the "Elk Point 2" immutable file caps: <h
|5|unauthorized read|attack the encryption of the plaintext with *K1*|anyone|any one file|the security of the encryption scheme used for the plaintext, and the secrecy of the encryption key *K1*. The latter also depends on the security and seeding of the RNG that generated it.|2^*k*^|
|6|unauthorized read|figure out the input to the hash function that generates *S*|anyone|any one file|the hash function's onewayness for (*R*,*T*) -> *S*|brute force on *R* is !#2|
|7|unauthorized deletion|brute force KD|anyone|any one file|secrecy of *KD*|2^*d*^|
|8|unauthorized deletion|figure out the destroy key KD from Dhash|anyone|any one file|the hash function's preimage resistance on *Dhash*|2^min(*d*,*dh*)^|
|8|unauthorized deletion|figure out a working destroy key KD from Dhash|anyone|any one file|the hash function's preimage resistance on *Dhash*|2^min(*d*,*dh*)^|
|9|denial of service|prevent access to servers holding sufficient shares (by controlling some of them, or by attacking them or the network)|anyone|any file|not prevented by crypto|n/a|
|10|cause invalid share to verify|generate (*K1enc*,*Dhash*,*V*) that hash to someone else's (*T*,*U*), and copy their *S*|anyone|any one file|the hash function's second-preimage resistance on (*T*,*U*)|2^*t*+*u*^|
|11|undeletion [3]footnote|restore a deleted file's shares by controlling the relevant servers|anyone|any one file|not prevented by crypto|n/a|