diff --git a/NewCaps/WhatCouldGoWrong.md b/NewCaps/WhatCouldGoWrong.md
index d0a3ca3..b3aefd5 100644
--- a/NewCaps/WhatCouldGoWrong.md
+++ b/NewCaps/WhatCouldGoWrong.md
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ This is about What Could Go Wrong with the "Elk Point 2" immutable file caps: <h
 |3|forgery of immutable file|generate a matching read-cap (*R*,*T*) for someone else's file|anyone|any one file|the hash function's and cap format's second-preimage resistance on (*R*,*T*). This also depends on the encryption of *K1* being deterministic and correct.|2^*n*+*t*^|
 |4|roadblock or speedbump [2]footnote|generate (*K1enc*,*Dhash*,*V*) that hash to someone else's *T*, and copy their *S*|anyone|any one file|the hash function's and cap format's second-preimage resistance on *T*|2^*t*^|
 |5|unauthorized read|attack the encryption of the plaintext with *K1*|anyone|any one file|the security of the encryption scheme used for the plaintext, and the secrecy of the encryption key *K1*. The latter also depends on the security and seeding of the RNG that generated it.|2^*k*^|
-|6|unauthorized read|figure out the input to the hash function that generates *S*|anyone|any one file|the hash function's preimage resistance on *S*|brute force on *R* is !#2|
+|6|unauthorized read|figure out the input to the hash function that generates *S*|anyone|any one file|the hash function's onewayness on *S*|brute force on *R* is !#2|
 |7|unauthorized deletion|brute force KD|anyone|any one file|secrecy of *KD*|2^*d*^|
 |8|unauthorized deletion|figure out the destroy key KD from Dhash|anyone|any one file|the hash function's preimage resistance on *Dhash*|2^min(*d*,*dh*)^|
 |9|denial of service|prevent access to servers holding sufficient shares (by controlling some of them, or by attacking them or the network)|anyone|any file|not prevented by crypto|n/a|